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Book Note: Too Big To Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise With
Corporations, by Brandon L. Garrett
Abstract

OVER THE PAST DECADE, the criminal justice system has been confronted with a staggering increase in
prosecutions of corporations. In Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations,1 Brandon
L. Garrett explores the “hidden world” of corporate prosecutions2 and looks at what happens when a major
company is prosecuted in the United States. Using compiled data of corporate settlement agreements and
convictions from the past decade, the author reveals that prosecutors fail to effectively punish corporate
crimes. Garrett draws upon his research to bring the necessary attention to corporate crime and to reflect on
whether enough is being done to properly hold corporations accountable for their misconduct. In chapter
one, Garrett sets the tone for the disheartening notion that large organizations are “too big to jail” and details
the many challenges faced by federal prosecutors, analogizing a corporate prosecution to the Biblical battle
between David and Goliath. The author examines the more lenient approaches used by federal prosecutors,
noting a decline in convictions of companies accompanied by an expansion in the use of deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements, which are settlement agreements that focus on improving and restructuring
the corporation.
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OVER THE PAST DECADE, the criminal justice system has been confronted with

a staggering increase in prosecutions of corporations. In Too Big to Jail: How
Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations,1 Brandon L. Garrett explores the
“hidden world” of corporate prosecutions2 and looks at what happens when
a major company is prosecuted in the United States. Using compiled data of
corporate settlement agreements and convictions from the past decade, the
author reveals that prosecutors fail to effectively punish corporate crimes. Garrett
draws upon his research to bring the necessary attention to corporate crime
and to reflect on whether enough is being done to properly hold corporations
accountable for their misconduct.
In chapter one, Garrett sets the tone for the disheartening notion that large
organizations are “too big to jail” and details the many challenges faced by federal
prosecutors, analogizing a corporate prosecution to the Biblical battle between
David and Goliath. The author examines the more lenient approaches used by
federal prosecutors, noting a decline in convictions of companies accompanied by
an expansion in the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements,
which are settlement agreements that focus on improving and restructuring
the corporation.
1.
2.

(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2014) 365 pages.
Ibid at 18.
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In chapters two and three, Garrett describes the shift in corporate
prosecutions from corporate conviction to corporate rehabilitation. Chapter two
details the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen in the Enron scandal
following its criminal conviction in 2002, and the author asserts that this case
changed the way in which federal prosecutors approached corporate prosecutions.
Chapter three explores the emergence of the use of deferred prosecution and
non-prosecution agreements in corporate criminal cases.
Chapter four illustrates the difficulties in individual prosecutions, making
particular reference to the use of the “ostrich defense,”3 and provides empirical
data to bring evidence to this effect. For instance, in cases involving deferred
prosecution or non-prosecution agreements, only 35 per cent were accompanied
by prosecutions of corporate officers and employees.4 Using the example of the
BP Texas City refinery explosion, chapter five addresses the meaningful role that
victims can play in corporate prosecutions. Garrett notes the rising amounts
of restitution paid by convicted organizations,5 lauding such payments as an
important way in which companies can be held accountable.
In chapter six, Garrett criticizes judges and prosecutors for their leniency
in sentencing corporations and argues that convictions are inadequate if they
are not accompanied by appropriate punishment. Chapter seven discusses the
role of independent corporate monitors in ensuring compliance and overseeing
structural reform. Garrett highlights the need for more prosecutorial appointments
of corporate monitors6 and greater judicial involvement in supervising the
compliance process. In chapter eight, the author briefly delves into a discussion
of the constitutional rights afforded to corporations and how these rights may
affect criminal prosecutions.
Chapter nine shifts the discussion from domestic prosecutions to foreign
prosecutions, which represent 13 per cent of the corporate prosecutions that
comprise the author’s compiled data.7 There has been a sizeable increase in
prosecutions of foreign companies, and Garrett reveals that corporate fines
against foreign firms are much larger compared to those against domestic firms.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The “ostrich defense” may be used by corporate executives who claim ignorance of criminal
activities of lower level employees.
Garrett, supra note 1 at 83.
Ibid at 125-27.
The author observes that only 25 per cent of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements required a monitor to provide independent supervision of compliance.
See Garrett, ibid at 174-75.
Ibid at 219. The majority of the foreign corporations were convicted of the following crimes:
antitrust, ocean pollution, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 violations (ibid).
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In focusing on the relative success of foreign corporate prosecutions, Garrett
hopes that US prosecutors can learn from approaches used in the foreign context
for domestic prosecutions.
In chapter ten, Garrett offers his concluding thoughts on the current system
for prosecuting corporations, exploring three matters: “‘too big to jail’ concerns”
with corporate prosecutions, evaluations of corporate prosecutions, and various
concrete reforms (touched on in previous chapters of the book) that could make
for more effective corporate prosecutions.
Garrett’s detailed and comprehensive examination of corporate criminal
prosecutions paints a grim but realistic picture of corporate crimes—the
complexities inherent in prosecuting large companies mean that corporations are
often not held accountable for their crimes. Too Big to Jail stands as an important
contribution to existing information on corporate prosecutions, revealing the
inadequacies of current approaches used by federal prosecutors and addressing
new ways in which to effect meaningful criminal punishment of corporations.

